

28 March 1975

The Honorable Philip C. Habib
Assistant Secretary for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs
Department of State
Washington, D. C. 20520

Dear Phil:

This is a very rough cut at an
idea. I frankly think it might help
out there. You would be the better
judge of its effect here.

Sincerely,

W. E. Colby
W. E. Colby
Director

WEC:jlpl (28 March 1975)

Distribution:

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Volunteers for Vietnam

A Proposal

I. Introduction

There is a large number of Americans who:

- Know the Vietnamese people and culture;
- Understand the Vietnamese power structure and how it works;
- Have a strong sense of commitment to the South Vietnamese people;
- Are frustrated and want to help.

We could draw on this talent to provide an all civilian, volunteer team of highly qualified, experienced and dedicated professionals to the GVN during the current emergency.

II. Purpose

The volunteer team could:

- Assist the GVN to regain and retain control over the situation;
- Assist the GVN in preserving what will be left of SVN after the current dry season;
- Evidence to the South Vietnamese and the world some semblance of our support to the South Vietnamese people.

III. Concept

There are Americans who have served in SVN in almost every capacity, civilian and military, and during virtually every conceivable situation. There are ex-military and civilians who have fought alongside the South Vietnamese. There are civilians, and ex-military, who advised and worked with the South Vietnamese during the Tet offensive coping with extreme disorder, paralysis of

over the country. There are Americans who served at every level of the GVN from national to village. Many of these people would volunteer to help again.

A group of such people, carefully chosen, and carefully placed within the military and civilian structures of the GVN could operate effectively with a minimum of support. They could bring to the South Vietnamese not only moral support but administrative and organizational experience. They could help tighten and reinforce the relationship between military and civil administration needs and actions. Properly placed within the GVN power structure, they could provide a catalyst for action and perhaps more important a separate, reliable set of eyes and ears for the national leadership of the GVN. And, incidentally, a source of information for the US that is unavailable today.

A few such volunteers in the right ministries and offices in Saigon, at Corps and Province level and at Division level would suffice. The only support required would be a reliable communications net. They could fit into the current Embassy organization through the existing office of Special Assistant to the Ambassador for Field Operations.

Assuming that the current fighting will leave the GVN with enclaves in MR II around Qui Nhon, Tuy Hoa, Nha Trang and Cam Ranh, defensible positions in Phuoc Tuy, Bien Hoa, Binh Duong, Hau Nghia and Gia Dinh and the Capital Mil. Dist. in MR III, and all of MR IV, the size of the volunteer group could be as small as 250-300 people. This would provide the following network:

- Saigon - 41
 - Ministries - 8
 - Headquarters - 33
- Corps and Capital Mil Dist - 16 $\frac{1}{4}$
 - 4 each
- Division - 44 $\frac{1}{4}$
 - 4 each
- Province - 124 $\frac{1}{4}$
 - 4 each

This deployment would result in about 50 radio stations. Preliminary indications are that there are sufficient radios in country to provide each location with a principal radio, a back-up and a mobile communications capability (single side-band radios--not a secure net which would be considerably more difficult). The volunteers would live off the country for their food and outside Saigon would depend on the SVN for housing and transportation support. Emergency transportation and other emergency support could be provided by the DAO. In Saigon the Embassy, DAO, or AID should be able to provide housing and transportation.

Cost

Salaries and allowances:

Transportation:

25X1
25X1

Pros and Cons

Pros

- Shot in the arm to SVN
- Possibility of bringing order out of chaos
- A useful demonstration internationally
- Better intelligence for GVN and US

Cons

- Congressional view of "here we go again"
- NVN view as best we can do--futile gesture
- May appear condescending to SVN and also the best we can do

Sponsorship

This program, if undertaken, should be governmental, fully explained to the Congress and, if necessary, specific Congressional approval obtained. The specific sponsorship and administrative responsibility could reside with:

- State/AID
- CIA - on overt basis
- DOD contract with private corporation